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FIRST LOOK
Poverty, Tax Competition, and Base Erosion
by Michael C. Durst
The Corporate Tax Dilemma Faced by 
Lower-Income Countries
The Need for Public Revenues
This book is, at its heart, about the alleviation 
of poverty. The last 20 years have seen a reduction 
of poverty in many areas of the world;1 but despite 
this improvement, living conditions for millions 
of people in the world fall short of minimally 
acceptable levels of dignity and personal security. 
As of 2015, approximately 700 million people, 
about 10 percent of the world’s population, were 
trying to live on less than the equivalent of $1.90 
per day, which is the World Bank’s indicator of 
extreme poverty.
High levels of poverty are reflected in 
dramatic differences in health and other social 
indicators between lower-income and wealthier 
countries. In Australia, for example, average life 
expectancy at birth is 82.8 years; in Malawi it is 
58.3 years.2 In Equatorial Guinea, 342 women die 
in childbirth for every 100,000 births; in France the 
comparable number is eight. In Myanmar, 50 of 
every 1,000 children who are born die by the age 
of five; in Norway the mortality rate for children 
under age five is 2.6 per 1,000. The disparities 
extend not only to health but also to education, 
even at the most basic level. For example, in Japan, 
as of 2013, virtually all primary-school aged 
children were enrolled in school; in West and 
Central Africa, about 25 percent were not.3
This book is motivated by the inescapable fact 
that lower-income countries will need to invest 
heavily in public infrastructure — in schools, 
Michael C. Durst is a 
senior fellow of the 
International Centre for 
Tax and Development 
(ICTD) in Brighton, 
U.K. He is a tax lawyer 
and tax commentator in 
Washington, has taught 
at several law schools, 
and from 1994 to 1997 
served as director of the 
IRS Advance Pricing 
Agreement Program.
Durst is also the 
author of the 
forthcoming book Taxing Multinational Business 
in Lower-Income Countries: A Problem of 
Economics, Politics and Ethical Norms, which Tax 
Notes International is serializing in six 
installments over the coming months. The book 
explores a topic that has been highly 
controversial in recent years: the use by 
multinational companies of “base erosion and 
profit-shifting” tax planning structures to 
reduce their tax liabilities in countries where 
they conduct business, including the world’s 
lower-income developing countries. In this 
installment, which is Chapter 2, the author 
examines the basic economic dilemma faced by 
lower-income countries with respect to the 
corporate tax and offers an historical overview 
of BEPS-style corporate tax planning. The first 
installment appeared in Tax Notes Int’l, Feb. 19, 
2018, p. 713.
The author would like to thank those 
colleagues who have generously read and 
commented on drafts; the author is, of course, 
solely responsible for any shortcomings that 
remain. The author also is grateful to the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, which funded 
this book through a grant to the International 
Centre for Tax and Development. The opinions 
stated in this book are those of the author, and 
should not be attributed to any other person or 
institution.
Copyright 2018 Michael C. Durst.
1
See generally World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund, 
“Development Goals in an Era of Demographic Change” (2016), which is 
the source of the statistics in this paragraph.
2
The health statistics in this and the following sentence are from 
World Health Organization, World Health Statistics 2017 (2017).
3
Data from UNICEF, UNICEF Data: Monitoring the Situation of 
Children and Women (2018).
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hospitals and clinics, roads, water and sanitation 
systems, electrical generating facilities, police and 
fire and ambulance departments, and many other 
kinds of facilities — if the residents of those 
countries are to have hopes for dignified and 
reasonably secure lives. Moreover, the skilled 
personnel needed to staff this infrastructure will 
need to be trained and compensated. Funding 
these needs will require the governments of 
lower-income countries to generate substantially 
increased public revenues.
Special Reliance of Lower-Income Countries on 
Corporate Tax Revenues
Lower-income countries, however, typically 
are far more limited in their ability to raise 
government revenues than are the world’s 
wealthier countries.4 In wealthier countries, the 
bulk of government revenues come from broadly 
applied forms of personal taxation, including the 
personal income tax and consumption taxes like 
the value added tax (VAT). In poorer countries, 
however, low per capita earnings in themselves 
limit the amount of revenue potentially available 
from personal income and consumption taxes. 
Moreover, in lower-income countries, a large 
proportion of economic activity tends to be 
“informal,” in the sense that many business 
transactions are conducted in untraceable cash 
and many employment arrangements are not 
formally documented.5 The combination of low 
per capita income and economic informality 
limits the ability of many developing countries to 
raise revenue from “workhorse” taxes like the 
personal income tax and the VAT.
In addition to personal income and 
consumption taxes, the corporate income tax 
exists in virtually every country in the world. 
Over time, the corporate income tax has fallen 
into political disfavor in many of the world’s 
wealthy countries. Many believe that as a general 
matter, taxes on corporate income unduly 
discourage business investment and therefore 
economic growth. This concern has been 
magnified by the great increase in the mobility of 
capital in recent decades, causing countries at all 
levels of economic development to engage in tax 
competition.
Lower-income countries, however, generally 
have not been able to reduce the relative 
importance of the corporate income tax in their 
fiscal systems. As of 2012, the IMF has estimated 
that in the world’s high-income countries, 
corporate tax revenues accounted for slightly over 
8 percent of total government revenues (not 
including social contributions), whereas in both 
low and lower-middle income countries, reliance 
on corporate taxation was about twice as high, at 
approximately 16 percent of total government 
revenues less social contributions.6
What Level of Corporate Taxation Is Desirable for 
Lower-Income Countries?
Despite the relatively large role that the 
corporate income tax plays in their fiscal systems, 
lower-income countries face strong economic 
pressures to minimize the tax burdens they 
impose on corporations. Chronically high levels 
of unemployment, as well as other factors like the 
inability to offer investors the attraction of trained 
workforces and well-developed physical 
infrastructure like roads and other transportation 
facilities, typically place great pressures on lower-
income countries to sacrifice potential corporate 
tax revenue to attract foreign direct investment.7 
The tension between (i) the apparent need for 
lower-income governments to rely heavily on the 
corporate income tax for the generation of 
revenues, and (ii) the pressures on lower-income 
governments to limit corporate tax burdens in 
order to encourage investment and economic 
growth, stands at the heart of the unresolved 
problem of BEPS-style tax avoidance that this 
book seeks to explore. How vigorously should the 
government of a lower-income country seek to 
4
See generally IMF Policy Paper, “Spillovers in International 
Corporate Taxation” (May 2014), at 7.
5
High rates of subsistence agriculture, which does not generate 
taxable cash flows, contribute to the high rate of informality in the 
economies of poorer countries. See, e.g., Richard M. Bird, “Tax and 
Development: What Have We Learned from Fifty Years of Research?” 
ICTD Working Paper No. 1 (Apr. 2012), at 8.
6
IMF Policy Paper, supra note 4, at 7.
7
The term “foreign direct investment,” or FDI, refers to cross-border 
investments representing controlling interests in business operations, 
such as the formation by a multinational company of a new subsidiary to 
be active in a country, or the acquisition of an ongoing business by 
merger or cash acquisition. FDI is distinguished from “portfolio 
investment,” meaning the acquisition by investors of noncontrolling 
(minority) interests in business operations. See Investopedia, “Foreign 
Direct Investment — FDI.”
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increase tax revenues by removing opportunities 
for companies to benefit from tax planning, if one 
of the possible effects of doing so is a reduction of 
foreign direct investment?
Development economists generally approach 
this question in two conceptual stages. First, they 
ask whether a lower-income country’s aggregate 
revenues — revenues from all sources of taxation, 
including but not limited to the corporate income 
tax — are currently too low. That is, does the 
revenue generated by a country appear too low to 
finance the minimum level of public 
infrastructure, and public services, needed to 
afford the country’s residents realistic promise of 
eliminating extreme poverty and creating 
opportunities for all for dignified and secure 
lives?
Economists try to get some sense of the 
answer by comparing the ratios of tax revenues to 
the overall size of the economy (measured by 
gross domestic product, or GDP) in countries of 
different levels of economic development. As of 
2015, the median ratio of tax revenues to GDP was 
14 percent in low-income countries, 17 percent in 
lower-middle income countries, 21 percent in 
upper-middle income countries, and 32 percent in 
high income countries.8 It is clear that tax 
revenues per capita in lower-income countries 
tend to be far below the levels in wealthier 
countries. These numbers, coupled with the 
obviously inadequate levels of public 
infrastructure in the poorest countries, lead many 
development economists to conclude that 
significant increases in the ratio of tax to GDP in 
lower-income countries would make possible 
benefits in social well-being.9
Of course, raising the additional revenues will 
not in itself generate greater social well-being; it 
also will be necessary to translate the additional 
revenues into high-quality social infrastructure, 
which means avoiding misappropriation 
through, for example, corruption and 
governmental inefficiency.10 Thus, achieving the 
goal of substantially enhanced social welfare in 
lower-income countries will require initiatives in 
areas of governmental function in addition to the 
raising of revenues. Nevertheless, even if not 
sufficient in themselves to promote welfare gains 
in lower-income countries, additional tax 
revenues seem to be a prerequisite for lower-
income governments to achieve significant 
alleviation of poverty within their jurisdictions. 
Provided it is recognized that additional policy 
initiatives also are required for the alleviation of 
poverty, especially in the area of governance, it 
seems right to conclude that increasing 
government revenues represents a desirable and 
even urgent policy goal for lower-income 
countries.
The next question is the extent to which the 
government of a particular lower-income country 
would be rational in seeking enhanced revenues 
from the corporate income tax as opposed to other 
available forms of taxation. It will be useful first, 
for purposes of analysis, to consider this question 
on the concededly unrealistic assumption that the 
country is not subject to forces of tax competition: 
that is, that potential inbound investors are not 
able to redirect their investments to other 
countries that might be able to offer a more 
attractive tax environment.
In the absence of tax competition, a rational 
government will choose to impose corporate 
income taxes until the point at which the 
perceived social benefits from the additional 
revenue collected (in terms of ability to meet the 
social needs within a country) just balances the 
social detriment to the country from the expected 
suppression of inbound investment from an 
additional increment of corporate taxation. This 
level of corporate taxation can be described as the 
level that would be optimal for the country in the 
absence of tax competition.11 The notion of an 
optimal level of taxation is largely theoretical; 
there is, of course, no exact or easy way in which 
8
Source: CTD/UNU-WIDER, Government Revenue Dataset (Nov. 
2017). The author is grateful to Kyle McNabb of UNU-WIDER for 
compiling the data reported in the text.
9
See generally International Monetary Fund, Revenue Mobilization 
in Developing Countries (Mar. 8, 2011).
10
See, e.g., Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, “Why Do 
Developing Countries Tax So Little?” 28 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
99 (2014) at 113 ff.
11
The study of the extent to which it is rational for governments to 
attempt to raise revenue from different kinds of taxation is called 
“optimal tax theory,” and there is an extensive literature on the topic. 
Important statements of the theory include, among others, Robin 
Boadway and Michael Keen, “Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal 
Income Taxation,” 34 International Economic Review 463 (1993); and Peter 
A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees, “Optimal Taxation and Public 
Production I: Production Efficiency,” 61 American Economic Review 8 
(1971).
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a government can determine its optimal level of 
corporate taxation. Both the social benefit and 
social harm from a given level of taxation cannot 
be qualified precisely, a great deal of subjectivity 
is involved, and the views of political actors will 
differ. Nevertheless, despite the practical 
limitations, all rational governments must make 
at least an implicit comparison between social 
benefits and costs when deciding the level at 
which to impose a corporate income tax (or for 
that matter any other kind of taxation).
One of the questions to be taken into account 
in weighing the social costs of corporate income 
taxation is the likelihood that the tax will 
discourage investment within a country, and 
thereby employment and economic growth. All 
forms of taxation, including personal income and 
consumption as well as corporate taxation, 
impose costs on a society through the distortion of 
economic activity. For example, personal income 
taxes, and even to some extent consumption taxes, 
suppress both work effort and savings in an 
economy. It often is argued, however, that the 
corporate income tax imposes more serious 
economic distortions than most other kinds of 
taxes. The corporate income tax is imposed 
entirely on income from capital investment, 
whereas most other forms of taxation, like 
personal income and consumption taxation, are 
imposed largely on income derived from 
individuals’ labor. Many economists believe that 
corporations are more likely to cut back on their 
levels of investment, if corporate tax burdens are 
increased, to a greater extent than individuals are 
likely to reduce their labor efforts if personal 
income and consumption taxes are increased. 
Therefore, it often is argued that corporate income 
taxation, by the suppression of investment and 
economic growth, imposes more serious welfare 
costs than other commonly used forms of 
taxation, including personal income and 
consumption taxation.
The literature on the extent, if any, to which 
corporate income taxation in fact constricts 
investment is very extensive,12 and there is 
legitimate room for disagreement among scholars 
as to its interpretation. I can offer no resolution of 
this longstanding debate. Leaving aside 
disagreements over the interpretation of data, 
however, my professional experience provides 
anecdotal reason to believe that even aside from 
the influence of tax competition, corporate income 
taxation imposed by a country generally does 
reduce capital investment into that country, 
probably to a significant extent. Companies 
typically base investment decisions on required 
“threshold” rates of return: that is, a company 
evaluates whether the after-tax rate of return from 
an investment is likely to exceed a minimum 
threshold level, based on the company’s cost of 
capital and the risk that the company perceives 
itself as facing with respect to the investment.13 
Because imposition of a corporate income tax 
lowers companies’ anticipated after-tax rates of 
return, it seems likely that at least in some cases, 
the tax prevents otherwise profitable investments 
from being made.
Corporate income taxation does not suppress 
investment in all circumstances, or equally for 
different kinds of companies. Some businesses, 
particularly those owning high-value intangible 
property like patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks, enjoy unusually high levels of 
profitability (which economists call “rents” or 
“quasi-rents”) for extended periods of time. These 
businesses will be less likely to reduce investment 
in response to corporate tax increases than 
businesses earning only normal levels of profit. 
Even the most highly profitable businesses, 
however, will base their new investment decisions 
on expected after-tax rates of return, and there 
may be levels of corporate tax at which they will 
decline to invest. Therefore, I think it reasonable 
to assume that as a general matter, there is some 
12
For analyses with extensive collections of citations, see, e.g., Simeon 
Djankov, Tim Ganser, Caralee McLiesh, Rita Ramalho, and Andrei 
Shleifer, “The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and 
Entrepreneurship,” 2 American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 31 
(2010); and Department of Finance, Government of Ireland, “Literature 
Review of the Economic Effect of Corporation Tax” (Oct. 2014).
13
For example, a company might consider opening a new 
manufacturing plant. The company estimates that given the risk of the 
investment as well as the company’s cost of raising funds, the company 
needs to anticipate that the factory will need to generate after-tax profit 
at the rate of at least 11 percent per year, over the factory’s useful life, in 
order to represent a prudent investment. The company projects that the 
factory will generate a before-tax return of 15 percent per year; and if the 
company’s effective corporate income tax rate is 20 percent, the 
anticipated after-tax rate of return will be 0.80 x 15 percent, or 12 percent, 
and the company will decide to proceed with the envisioned investment. 
If, however, the effective corporate income tax rate is increased to 30 
percent, then the company’s anticipated after-tax return from building 
the factory will be 0.70 x 15 percent, or 10.5 percent. Because this is below 
the company’s required threshold anticipated return, the investment will 
not be made.
For more Tax Notes International content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
©
 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
FIRST LOOK
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, MARCH 19, 2018  1193
inverse relationship between the effective 
corporate tax rate imposed by a country and 
demand for inbound investment into that country.
Economists have sought to approximate, from 
empirical data, the overall social cost of the 
suppression of capital investment that results 
from the corporate income tax. The analysis 
involves too many variables for results to be 
estimated with any real degree of confidence.14 
Nevertheless, the notion that corporate income 
taxation imposes significant costs in terms of 
social welfare, by suppressing demand for 
corporate investment and therefore constraining 
employment and economic growth, seems 
reasonably well grounded.
Of course, the effect on demand for capital 
investment is not the only criterion on which the 
corporate income tax should be compared with 
other available forms of taxation. For well over a 
century, proponents and opponents of corporate 
income taxation have differed as to the 
desirability of the tax according to several 
additional criteria.15
Perhaps most importantly, it often is argued 
that the corporate income tax brings additional 
fairness (progressivity) to a country’s tax system, 
since the burden of the tax appears to be borne by 
the owners of corporate shares, who are likely to 
fall among the wealthiest persons in society. This 
argument perhaps has special weight in the 
context of cross-border investment by 
multinationals in lower-income countries, since 
the shareholders who are taxed are likely to reside 
abroad, in countries wealthier than that in which 
the investment is being made. Some therefore 
view the corporate income tax as desirable in 
reducing economic inequality on a global scale.
As an empirical matter, the distribution of the 
economic burden of the corporate income tax (its 
“incidence”), like so much else about the 
corporate tax, is uncertain.16 It seems clear that 
corporate shareholders do bear a substantial part 
of the tax’s burden; but workers also bear part of 
the burden because of the tax’s suppression of 
capital investment and hence employment. This 
effect is probably especially important in lower-
income countries, where much poverty, as well as 
political instability, can be associated with a lack 
of employment opportunity. Measurements of the 
relative extent to which the burden is shared 
between capital and labor, however, are 
obstructed by the same difficulties encountered in 
measuring the tax’s effects on demand for capital 
investment; indeed, the debates over the 
incidence of the corporate tax, and the extent to 
which the tax suppresses capital investment, are 
largely co-extensive. Therefore, definitive 
answers to questions concerning the incidence of 
the corporate tax have long been elusive and 
probably will remain so.
Another factor to be weighed in determining a 
desirable level of corporate income taxation in 
lower-income countries is the social value to be 
placed on encouraging foreign direct investment. 
On one hand, the persistence of extreme poverty 
in lower-income countries seems to reflect low 
levels of productive capital in those countries, 
resulting in a paucity of opportunities for 
employment. The encouragement of inbound 
investment, in part through limiting corporate 
income tax burdens, would therefore seem to be a 
logical component of a national development 
policy. Against this, however, some have argued 
that foreign direct investment sometimes inflicts 
net social damage on a country. Among the 
concerns raised have been that FDI can (i) confer 
excessive political influence on investing 
companies, leading, for example, to lax labor and 
environmental regulation; (ii) create 
opportunities for official corruption; and (iii) 
inhibit the growth of (“crowd out”) locally owned 
businesses. These and other asserted drawbacks 
14
For insights into the complexity of seeking to measure welfare costs 
of taxation, see, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle, “International Corporate Tax Rate 
Comparisons and Policy Implications,” Congressional Research Service 
(2014); and James R. Hines, “Excess Burden of Taxation,” University of 
Michigan, Ross School of Business (2007).
15
Arguments for and against corporate income taxation on various 
grounds have been debated especially intensively in the United States, 
where the origins of the corporate tax, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
involved explicit disagreement over fundamental political ideologies. 
See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, “Corporate Regulation and the 
Origins of the Corporate Income Tax,” 66 Indiana Law Journal 53 (1990); 
and Ajay K. Mehrota, “The Public Control of Corporate Power: 
Revisiting the 1909 U.S. Corporate Tax from a Comparative Perspective,” 
Maurer School of Law, Indiana University (2010). See also Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, “Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate 
Tax,” 90 University of Virginia Law Review 1193 (2004).
16
See, e.g., Kimberly A. Clausing, “In Search of Corporate Tax 
Incidence,” 65 Tax Law Review 433 (2012); William M. Gentry, “A Review 
of the Evidence on the Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax,” U.S. 
Treasury Dept., Office of Tax Analysis (Dec. 2007); Arnold C. Harberger, 
“The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax,” 70 Journal of Political 
Economy 215 (1962).
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of foreign direct investment have been, and are 
likely to remain, the subject of extensive debate.17 
Despite the valid concerns regarding negative 
spillover effects of inbound investment, however, 
I believe the probable view among most residents 
of lower-income countries, including most 
political leaders in those countries, is that on an 
overall basis, inbound investment is desirable in 
providing employment and increased per capita 
incomes. Certainly, most political leaders in 
lower-income countries would express this 
sentiment, and governments generally seem to 
make policy decisions in keeping with a 
perception of net social benefit from incremental 
inbound investment.
Many additional factors are relevant in 
seeking to judge a country’s optimal rate of 
corporate taxation (continuing to leave out of the 
analysis, for now, the factor of tax competition). 
These include (i) the feasibility of increasing 
yields from sources other than corporate taxation, 
like personal income and consumption taxes; (ii) 
whether a country offers special advantages to 
potential investors, like large consumer markets 
or valuable mineral deposits, which might reduce 
the dampening effect of corporate taxation on 
inbound investment; (iii) whether a country 
possesses the administrative capacity to translate 
additional tax revenues into socially beneficial 
expenditures; and (iv) the extent to which a 
country is able to manage external costs, like 
environmental damage, of the kinds of 
investment that will be made. There is, of course, 
no quantitatively precise way for the necessary 
balancing to be made; a great deal of subjective 
judgment is involved. But the point is that 
conceptually, leaving aside for the moment the 
factor of tax competition, a rational country 
would through its political system make a 
judgment of the optimal level of corporate 
taxation to impose, based (broadly speaking) on a 
weighing of social value of the revenues to be 
collected under the corporate income tax, against 
the social cost of the tax’s anticipated inhibition of 
investment.
The Central Role of Tax Competition
In all countries of the world, even the 
wealthiest, the level of corporate income tax 
revenues is almost certainly much lower than the 
country’s government would find optimal in a 
world without tax competition. In recent decades, 
improvements in communications and 
transportation technology, and reductions in 
political obstacles (like currency exchange 
controls and restrictions on foreign ownership of 
local assets), have combined to ease, dramatically, 
the process of cross-border investment. Today, 
multinational companies have substantial 
latitude to choose among countries in which to 
locate a project or venture, and this includes 
shopping among potential host countries for the 
most attractive total investment “package,” one 
important element of which will be the tax regime 
that is offered.
Investors do not have the opportunity to shop 
among countries in every instance, since 
sometimes circumstances dictate that an 
investment be made in a particular place. For 
example, a country might have uniquely valuable 
and accessible deposits of a mineral that the 
investor seeks to exploit, or a country may be so 
populous that a seller of consumer products has 
little practical choice but to establish distribution 
operations within the country. Situations, 
however, in which a company has available only 
one country in which to make an envisioned 
investment are relatively unusual. For example, 
although possessing rich natural resource 
endowments does seem to provide governments 
with some insulation from tax competition,18 
natural resource developers cannot exploit all 
opportunities simultaneously, and governments 
17
For a useful collection of essays on this topic, see Theodore H. 
Moran, Edward M. Graham, and Magnus Blomström, eds., Does Foreign 
Direct Investment Promote Development? (2005). Additional thoughtful 
essays include Yariv Brauner, “The Future of Tax Incentives for 
Developing Countries,” in Tax, Law and Development (2013), at 25; and 
Tsilly Dagan, “The Tragic Choices of Tax Policy in a Globalized 
Economy,” in the same volume at 57. See also, e.g., Mohammad Amin 
Almfraji and Mahmoud Khalid Almsafir, “Foreign Direct Investment 
and Economic Growth Literature Review from 1994 to 2012,” Procedia — 
Social and Behavioral Sciences (May 2014).
18
See Mario Mansour and Artur Swistak, “Tax Competition and 
Coordination in Extractive Industries,” in International Taxation and the 
Extractive Industries (2016) (observing based on the limited available 
empirical data that tax competition probably plays a relatively limited 
role in extractive industries, but that it nevertheless is a factor relevant to 
sound policymaking). It is my personal impression that tax competition 
plays an important role in circumstances involving natural resource 
deposits of ordinary size and profit potential (like, say, iron ore deposits 
in some parts of the world) although tax competition probably is of 
limited significance in connection with deposits of unique or nearly 
unique potential profit potential, like the North Sea oilfields in the 1970s.
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often seem eager to provide natural resource 
companies with tax or other financial incentives to 
encourage the prompt exploitation of local 
deposits. Similarly, companies selling consumer 
products need to prioritize among various 
available markets in which to establish 
distribution networks, and tax incentives might 
well influence the choice of which markets to 
enter first. It is my subjective observation that tax 
competition plays a strong role in virtually all 
negotiations between investing companies and 
the governments of potential host countries; and 
empirical evidence strongly supports that tax 
competition is an important influence on 
government policymaking throughout the 
world.19
This is not to suggest that relative tax burdens 
are the only factors that companies consider in 
deciding where to locate investments. A large 
variety of other factors also are influential 
including (but not limited to) the presence of 
infrastructure in a country like roads, ports, 
communication facilities, and safety and law 
enforcement resources; political stability 
(including the reliability of legal process); the 
availability of a trained workforce; and proximity 
to intended markets. Nevertheless, the different 
tax regimes that countries offer also can be an 
influential factor, and among countries that are 
roughly similar with respect to the nontax 
advantages they offer investors, differences in tax 
regime might well determine a company’s choice 
of where to locate a proposed investment.
The presence of tax competition 
fundamentally alters a host government’s 
estimation of the most desirable effective tax rate 
to offer potential inbound investors. In the 
presence of tax competition, a government does 
not possess the market power to insist upon a 
level of taxation that reaches an optimal balance 
among competing factors, like the social 
desirability of enhanced government revenues 
and the social cost of deterring investment. 
Instead, an investor is likely to insist upon a lower 
effective rate of taxation, on threat of redirecting a 
proposed investment to another country. In this 
manner, what amounts to an auction — a “race to 
the bottom” — tends to ensue, in which the 
winning government, in one way or another, 
offers the investor a corporate tax rate of zero or 
near-zero (and might sweeten the pot with other 
incentives, like exemption from customs duties on 
imported supplies). As discussed below, the “one 
way or another” might involve the offering by a 
government of explicit exemptions from taxation 
(often called “tax holidays”); or it might involve 
tacit assurances that the government will, in 
practice, tolerate the substantial reduction of the 
investor’s tax burden through the kind of base 
erosion and profit shifting on which this book 
focuses. Whatever the route to effective exemption the 
government chooses, however, the bottom line is that 
tax competition is likely greatly to reduce, or even 
eliminate, the burden of the corporate tax on companies 
engaged in foreign direct investment.
The picture of an inevitable race to the bottom 
is to some extent overly simplified. Not all 
countries are equally vulnerable to international 
tax competition.20 A country that offers investors 
uniquely attractive geophysical advantages — for 
example, especially promising natural-resource 
deposits or unusually favorable natural harbors 
— may have the economic power to refrain from 
pursing the race all the way to the bottom. 
Similarly, if a country already has developed 
infrastructure that offers advantages to investing 
businesses, like a well-educated workforce, 
efficient transportation facilities and electrical 
generating capacity, and the like — the country 
may have sufficient bargaining power to insist on 
an effective corporate income tax rate that is 
significantly higher than zero. In addition — and 
this factor is especially important for populous 
countries like, say, India, China, and Indonesia — 
the presence of large domestic consumer markets 
might enable some countries to insist on positive 
corporate income tax rates on investment for 
companies that seek to exploit the local market.
Even when countries do not enjoy these kinds 
of bargaining advantages, it is likely that the race 
19
See, e.g., Michael P. Devereux, Ben Lockwood, and Michela 
Redoano, “Do Countries Compete Over Corporate Tax Rates?” 92 Journal 
of Public Economics 1210 (2008); Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud De Mooij, and 
Michael Keen, Base Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing Countries, 
IMF Working Paper (2015).
20
Useful discussions of the factors influencing countries’ differing 
degrees of vulnerability to tax competition include Thierry Madies and 
Jean-Jacques Dethier, “Fiscal Competition in Developing Countries: A 
Survey of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature,” 3 Journal of 
International Commerce, Economics and Policy 1250013 (2012); and Crivelli, 
DeMooij, and Keen, supra note 19.
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to the bottom will not result in zero effective tax 
rates for foreign investors. For purposes of 
protecting their reputations for social 
responsibility, or perhaps to promote comity with 
host governments, companies might not demand 
full exemption from taxation. Thus, investors may 
accept explicit exemptions that are partial rather 
than complete; or companies engaging heavily in 
BEPS-style tax planning may refrain from 
reporting zero income on their corporate returns, 
even though they probably could prevail in that 
position under applicable law. In fact, tax 
competition does not appear to reduce any 
country’s corporate tax collections to zero. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that tax competition 
significantly limits the ability of governments 
around the world to levy corporate income taxes; 
and owing largely to their limited existing 
infrastructures to support the activities of 
inbound investors, lower-income countries are 
especially vulnerable to the pressures of 
international tax competition.21
The answer to the question posed above 
therefore seems quite clear: International tax 
competition seems almost certain to result in lower 
levels of corporate income tax revenue than 
governments would find socially optimal in the absence 
of tax competition. Therefore, policies that would 
enable lower-income countries to increase 
corporate tax revenues to (or closer to) the levels 
that would prevail in the absence of tax 
competition should increase social well-being in 
the world’s poorest countries. The reduction of 
corporate income tax avoidance, as it currently 
affects lower-income countries, therefore should 
be seen as a desirable policy goal — and, given the 
persistence of extreme poverty in those countries, 
as a humanitarian imperative. This is not to say 
that curtailing corporate tax avoidance can in 
itself reduce poverty in a country — but it can be 
seen as an important step in that direction.22
The Historical Origins of BEPS-Style Corporate 
Tax Avoidance
Introduction
International tax competition is not a new 
phenomenon.23 To the contrary, it has affected 
governmental policies, in countries at all levels of 
economic development, at least from the start of 
the flowering of cross-border investment that 
began following the end of the Second World War. 
As will be amplified below, this book and its 
policy recommendations are based on the premise 
that since the end of the War, governments have 
sought to encourage inbound investment through 
two parallel kinds of tax policies. First, 
governments have offered inbound investors 
numerous kinds of explicit tax exemptions, for 
example in the form of “tax holidays” that exempt 
the income from new inbound investments for a 
specified number of years. Explicit exemptions 
typically are authorized by statute, and 
governments generally grant them on a 
discretionary basis to multinational groups that 
apply for the exemptions on a project-by-project 
basis.
In addition, very soon after the War, 
multinational corporations began to use global 
tax avoidance structures centered on the use of 
21
Although this book is concerned particularly with the effects of tax 
competition in lower-income countries, it is important to recognize that 
tax competition has, to varying degrees, affected public revenues in 
countries of all levels of economic development and has important social 
and political implications for every country. See especially Reuven S. 
Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the 
Welfare State,” 113 Harvard Law Review 1573 (2000).
In addition to Professor Avi-Yonah’s contribution, other thoughtful 
reflections on the nature and social consequences of international tax 
competition include Julie Roin, “Competition and Evasion: Another 
Perspective on International Tax Competition,” 89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 543 (2000); Peter Dietsch, Catching Capital: The Ethics of Tax 
Competition (2015); Tsilly Dagan, International Tax Policy: Beyond 
Competition and Cooperation (2017); and Lilian V. Faulhaber, “The Trouble 
with Tax Competition: From Practice to Theory,” 71 Tax Law Review 
(forthcoming 2018).
22
An important point should be raised to put the discussion in this 
book in proper perspective. Although this book urges continuing and 
serious efforts to improve the performance of the corporate income tax 
in lower-income countries, improvements to corporate taxation 
represent only one of many policy initiatives that are needed to assist 
lower-income countries in mobilizing revenues. Improvements to other 
kinds of taxation, as well as to government processes in areas like 
budgeting and public-sector accounting, also are urgently needed. The 
concentrated attention provided in recent years to the BEPS problem 
should not be permitted to divert policymakers from promising 
initiatives outside the area of corporate taxation. See, e.g., Maya 
Forstater, “Tax and Development: New Frontiers of Research and 
Action,” Center for Global Development (forthcoming); Mick Moore and 
Wilson Prichard, “How Can Governments of Low-Income Countries 
Collect More Tax Revenues?” ICTD Working Paper No. 70 (2017); and 
Michael C. Durst, “Limitations of the BEPs Reforms: Looking Beyond 
Corporate Taxation for Revenue Gains,” ICTD Working Paper No. 40 
(2015).
23
It is concededly anachronistic to use the words “BEPS-style” in a 
discussion of events occurring in the immediate aftermath of World War 
II, as “base erosion and profit shifting” and “BEPS” did not come into 
common usage until the initiation of the OECD’s BEPS work after the 
2008 Financial Crisis. I nevertheless use “BEPS” and “BEPS-style” even 
in entirely historical discussions, in part to emphasize the remarkably 
long continuity of the kinds of tax planning structures that the world 
continues to try to address.
For more Tax Notes International content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
©
 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
FIRST LOOK
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, MARCH 19, 2018  1197
subsidiaries in zero- and low-tax countries, in 
formats virtually identical to those used in base 
erosion and profit-shifting transactions today, to 
reduce the global corporate tax burdens on their 
growing international operations. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, various legal arguments 
might have been raised against the new planning 
structures by the governments of the countries 
from which income was being shifted. In the 
immediate post-War decades, however, few if any 
host governments of cross-border investment 
would have felt much incentive to challenge 
companies’ use of the new tax-planning 
structures. To the contrary, almost all countries 
saw themselves as competing with one another 
for foreign direct investment, and many were 
already offering investing companies explicit tax 
exemptions. By refraining from serious challenge 
to companies’ profit-shifting techniques, host 
countries could effectively expand the scope of 
tax incentives they were offering investors 
without the formal legislative action, and possible 
political controversy, entailed in offering 
additional explicit tax exemptions. I believe that 
in this manner, tacit policies were adopted in 
many countries of refraining from challenging 
companies’ tax avoidance arrangements.24
Explicit Tax Exemptions
Since the start of the flowering of cross-border 
investment that began after the Second World War 
and continues today, countries at all levels of 
economic development have offered corporations 
explicit exemptions from taxation to incentivize 
investment.25 These tax exemptions have taken 
many different forms.26 An especially common 
form has been the “tax holiday,” which generally 
is established by statute in developing countries. 
Under a tax holiday, investors generally apply to 
a governmental administrative body for 
exemptions on a project-by-project basis. 
Holidays are granted for a specified period (for 
example, fifteen years), although extensions of 
holidays are not unknown. Other common forms 
of explicit tax incentives include exemptions for 
investment in particular geographic areas of a 
country, and the allowance of generous tax write-
offs for investment in plant and equipment. The 
demand of inbound investors for explicit tax 
exemptions has seemed unlimited over the past 
60 years, and their growth appears to have 
accelerated in recent decades.27
Commentators sometimes criticize explicit tax 
incentives because they often seem wasted on 
inbound investments that would have been made 
even if the incentives had not been provided. In 
other words, incentives often seem to offer 
investors the prospect of after-tax returns that are 
higher than the “threshold” returns that would be 
necessary to justify a proposed investment. This 
should not be surprising, however, because 
governments perceiving severe pressures of tax 
competition can be expected to offer tax 
incentives that are more powerful than would be 
needed in the absence of tax competition.
In the early post-War decades, policymakers 
and researchers seem to have directed little 
criticism toward countries’ use of explicit tax 
incentives to attract cross-border investment. 
Instead, it seems generally to have been assumed 
that the offering of incentives represented a 
rational means of promoting social welfare 
through economic growth. The dominant 24Other commentaries have observed that the tacit acceptance of 
governments hosting foreign direct investment has been necessary for 
the perpetuation of BEPS-style tax avoidance. These include Roin, supra 
note 21, at 600; Faulhaber, supra note 21 (“jurisdictions are complicit in 
tax avoidance schemes”); and Rosanne Altshuler and Harry Grubert, 
“The Three Parties in the Race to the Bottom: Host Governments, Home 
Governments and Multinational Companies,” CESIFO Working Paper 
No. 1613 (2005), passim. Hugh J. Ault and Brian J. Arnold, “Protecting the 
Tax Base of Developing Countries: An Overview,” in United Nations 
Handbook on Selected Issues in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing 
Countries (2d ed. 2017), at 1, 47:
Tax incentives for foreign investment can be divided into two major 
categories:
(a) Incentives that directly reduce the cost to a non-resident of an 
investment in the source country (for example, a tax holiday or 
reduced tax rates); and
(b) Incentives that indirectly reduce the cost to a non-resident of 
an investment in the source country (for example, the lax 
enforcement of thin capitalization or transfer pricing rules by the 
source country).
25
A discussion of the early use of tax incentives by developing 
countries is provided in Jack Heller and Kenneth M. Kauffman, Tax 
Incentives for Industry in Less Developed Countries (1963).
26
Recent comprehensive explanations of the various kinds of explicit 
tax incentives that countries offer are provided by Eric M. Zolt, “Tax 
Incentives in Developing Countries: Maximizing the Benefits and 
Minimizing the Costs, in United Nations Handbook, supra note 24, at 523-
570; and by Ana Teresa Tavares-Lehman, “Types of Investment 
Incentives,” in Rethinking Investment Incentives — Trends and Policy 
Options (2016), 17, 25-27.
27
See Sebastian James, “Tax Incentives Around the World,” in 
Rethinking Investment Incentives, supra note 26, at 153-176; IMF, OECD, 
U.N., and World Bank, “Options for Low Income Countries’ Effective 
and Efficient Use of Tax Incentives for Investment,” Report to the G-20 
Development Working Group (2015), at 8.
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question among governments of the world’s 
wealthier countries seems not to have been 
whether to discourage developing countries from 
offering tax incentives, but whether the wealthier 
countries should actively promote the practice by 
granting certain tax credits to their home-based 
multinationals that had availed themselves of 
explicit tax exemptions in developing countries.28 
Most of the world’s wealthier countries at the time 
decided to grant the credits, whereas the United 
States did not, indicating a lesser degree of official 
enthusiasm for the use by developing countries of 
explicit tax exemptions to attract investment. 
Even in the United States, however, the rationality 
and normative wisdom of offering tax incentives 
to attract investment do not seem to have been 
questioned seriously in the early post-War period.
The Invention of BEPS-Style Corporate Tax 
Avoidance
Explicit exemptions like tax holidays, and tax 
relief for companies operating in special economic 
zones, have never been the only means by which 
countries used corporate tax exemptions to attract 
inbound investment. Very soon after the Second 
World War, multinational companies and their tax 
advisers developed techniques for avoiding the 
imposition of taxes on income earned in the 
countries around the world where they operated, 
without the need for those countries to extend 
formal tax exemptions through explicit 
legislation. These techniques have involved the 
use of four basic transactional structures, all of 
which have remained in use uninterruptedly, 
with remarkably little serious legal challenge, 
since at least the early 1950s.29 All of these 
transactional patterns feature prominently in the 
recent OECD studies of base erosion and profit 
shifting, as described in Chapter 4.
The four basic kinds of base erosion and 
profit-shifting transactions include the 
following:30
• Loan-based income-shifting transactions: A 
multinational group establishes a “finance 
company” in, for example, the Cayman 
Islands,31 contributing to the finance 
company a large amount of cash. The 
finance company then extends a loan to a 
group member that performs 
manufacturing operations in, for example, 
Kenya. The Kenyan operating company 
deducts interest paid on the loan, thereby 
reducing taxable income in Kenya, but no 
tax is imposed on receipt of the interest by 
the finance company in the Cayman Islands. 
Therefore, the group enjoys a reduction of 
its income tax in Kenya with no 
corresponding increase in its tax anywhere 
in the world.
• Intangibles-based income-shifting transactions: 
A group contributes valuable intellectual 
property, like the trademark to a popular 
brand of beer, to an “intangibles holding 
company” established in the Cayman 
Islands. A member of the group in, for 
example, Togo, which distributes the 
group’s beer in that country, pays royalties 
to the Cayman Islands company for the use 
of the trademark. The royalty payments are 
deductible in Togo, thereby reducing the 
distribution company’s tax liability in that 
28
Beginning in the 1960s, a number of governments of wealthy 
countries began offering “tax sparing credits” to their home-based 
multinationals that benefited from tax exemptions in developing 
countries. Under a tax-sparing credit regime, multinationals that, 
through a tax holiday or other incentive, avoided paying tax on income 
earned in a developing country could, when sending the income back to 
the home country (i.e., “repatriating” the income), receive a credit 
against home-country tax for the tax they would have paid in the 
developing country in the absence of the exemption. The home-country 
credit serves to protect the incentive effect of the exemption by the 
developing country, by preventing the imposition of home-country tax 
on the repatriation of the income that had been earned. (The United 
States, in contrast, generally has declined to offer tax-sparing credits to 
its investors in developing countries, on the ground that the 
subsidization of foreign tax exemptions was inconsistent with prudent 
public policy.) For a useful general discussion of tax sparing, see 
Deborah Toaze, “Tax Sparing: Good Intentions, Unintended Results,” 49 
Canadian Tax Journal 879 (2001); see also Dhammika Dharmapala and 
Céline Azémar, “Tax Sparing, FDI, and Foreign Aid: Evidence From 
Territorial Tax Reforms,” University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute 
for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 758 (Apr. 2016) (discusses 
continuing significance of tax sparing today).
29
A 1955 study of the taxation of cross-border investment contains 
detailed descriptions of all of the kinds of BEPS-style avoidance plans 
that are in common use today. E.R. Barlow and Ira T. Wender, Foreign 
Investment and Taxation (1955), at 168-171, 245-246.
30
The following summary is adapted from Michael C. Durst, 
“Assisting Developing Countries in Taxation After the OECD’s BEPS 
Reports: A Suggested Approach for the Donor Community,” ICTD 
Working Paper No. 71 (2017).
Extended explanations of the various kinds of BEPS transactions in 
use today are available in Edward J. Kleinbard, “Stateless Income,” 11 
Florida Tax Review 699 (2011), and “The Lessons of Stateless Income,” 65 
Tax Law Review 99 (2011); and in U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation, 
“Present Law and Background Related to Possible Income Shifting and 
Transfer Pricing” (2010).
31
All of these examples are for illustrative purposes only and are not 
intended to represent any particular transactions involving specific 
companies or countries; country names are used only to enhance the 
readability of the examples.
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country, but no tax is imposed when the 
royalties are received in the Cayman 
Islands. Again, the group as a whole enjoys 
a reduction of its income tax, this time in 
Togo, with no corresponding increase in its 
tax anywhere in the world.
• Income-shifting transactions involving related-
party transactions in services and tangible 
property: Often, groups establish “hub” or 
“principal” companies in zero- or low-tax 
tax countries to engage in a variety of 
income-shifting transactions involving sales 
of services and of tangible property. For 
example, a multinational mining group with 
a parent company in Belgium might 
establish a hub company in Bermuda. The 
Bermuda hub company might “purchase” 
valuable mining supplies and equipment 
from a group member based, for example, in 
Belgium and “resell” the supplies and 
equipment, with a profit markup, to a 
mining subsidiary based, for example, in 
Tanzania. Alternatively, the hub company 
might contract for the performance of 
technical services by employees of the 
Belgian parent company and “resell” the 
services, at a profit, to the Tanzanian 
company. Under both scenarios, payments 
from Tanzania contribute to tax-sheltered 
profits in the hands of the Bermuda 
company. The group effectively escapes 
taxation anywhere in the world on that 
portion of the group’s income that is 
attributed to the Bermuda hub company.
• Income-shifting transactions involving 
outbound sales of products: These kinds of 
income-shifting transactions are very 
common in the natural-resources and 
agricultural sectors.32 As an example, 
consider a steel manufacturing group that 
operates iron mines through subsidiaries 
the group has established in several iron-
rich countries around the world. The group 
establishes a purchasing company in 
Luxembourg, which imposes a corporate 
income tax on the subsidiary’s income at a 
very low rate. The group arranges for its 
various mining subsidiaries around the 
world to sell all their output of ore to the 
Luxembourg purchasing company. The 
purchasing company then resells most of 
the ore, at a markup, to manufacturing 
affiliates within its group; the remainder of 
the ore is sold to unrelated manufacturing 
companies. The purchases and resales of the 
ore by the Luxembourg marketing company 
are essentially fictional. The ore itself never 
touches Luxembourg but is instead shipped 
directly from the mining subsidiaries to the 
related or unrelated users of the ore. The 
Luxembourg marketing company merely 
takes legal title to the ore briefly, while it is 
in transit, pursuant to the contracts the 
group has drawn up among its various 
members. Despite the marketing company’s 
lack of physical involvement in the 
purchases and resales of ore, however, a 
significant portion of the group’s net income 
is assigned to the company, thereby 
escaping income taxation anywhere in the 
world.
These four common tax planning techniques 
have, over the seven decades since World War II, 
become universal in international business 
practice. Virtually all multinational companies 
use these techniques as their standard means of 
structuring their foreign direct investments. The 
point of all these techniques is to shift taxable 
income from countries where business is 
conducted to affiliates that the groups have 
established in low- or zero-income tax countries,33 
32
See generally Michael C. Durst, “Improving the Performance of 
Natural Resource Taxation in Developing Countries,” ICTD Working 
Paper No. 60 (2016).
33
The list of countries that have facilitated the establishment, by 
multinationals, of low- or zero-tax subsidiaries is quite wide. The list 
includes not only small island countries that conform to the typical 
public image of “tax havens,” but other countries, including some of the 
world’s major economic powers. (The participation of these 
“mainstream” countries, along with tax havens as traditionally 
understood, in tax avoidance planning often is required for technical 
reasons relating to the world’s network of international tax treaties, as 
will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.)
A 2010 study of profit-shifting by the U.S. Congress’s Joint 
Committee on Taxation, note 30 supra at 51-102, presents six extended 
case studies of profit-shifting plans involving U.S.-based multinationals. 
Countries mentioned as hosting entities involved in the profit-shifting 
include the Netherlands, Bermuda, Switzerland, and the Cayman 
Islands. Other countries often mentioned as central to profit-shifting 
planning include Mauritius (see, e.g., ActionAid, “Calling Time: Why 
SABMiller Should Stop Dodging Taxes in Africa” (2010; updated 2012)), 
Ireland (see, e.g., Jesse Drucker, “IRS Auditing How Google Shifted 
Profits,” Bloomberg.com (Oct. 13, 2013)); and Luxembourg (see, e.g., 
Margaret Burow, “Lux Rulings Reveal ‘Industrial Scale’ Tax Avoidance,” 
Tax Notes Int’l, Dec. 15, 2014, p. 963)). The countries just mentioned in 
fact represent only a very partial list of jurisdictions that have been host 
to corporate subsidiaries used in profit-shifting planning.
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thus lowering multinational groups’ overall 
international tax burdens; and the large number 
of these transactions means that very large 
amounts of corporate income tax are avoided 
around the world every year.
Given the complexity of international 
transactions, and the limitations of available data, 
it is not possible to estimate with precision the 
volume of corporate tax revenues that national 
governments lose to these transactions each year. 
Some indications are provided by the very large 
financial flows in and out of zero- and low-tax 
countries around the world, and the low global 
effective tax rates reported in annual financial 
statements of large multinational groups.34 Two 
recent attempts to use econometric techniques to 
estimate the revenue losses, both of which are 
presented only as very approximate, suggest that 
global losses of tax revenues to these transactions 
are in the range of $500 billion to $600 billion (that 
is, more than half a trillion dollars) annually, with 
non-OECD countries accounting for about half 
the total.35 No reliable estimates are, I believe, 
available for lower-income countries specifically, 
but it seems clear that revenues lost by lower-
income countries, which are most vulnerable to 
pressures of tax competition, are especially large.
The Legal Fiction at the Heart of BEPS-Style Tax 
Planning
All four kinds of profit-shifting structures 
share a common feature: They all involve the 
supposed “earning” of a portion of a 
multinational group’s income by a zero- or low-
tax subsidiary that needs to perform little if any 
observable business activity to generate its 
purported income. Thus, in the loan-centered 
avoidance plan, the “finance company” might 
have few or even no employees; other group 
members might simply deposit cash in the finance 
company’s bank account, typically through 
electronic transfer, and the cash can then be sent 
on immediately, via additional electronic transfer, 
to the group members to which money is lent. 
There is no need for personnel based anywhere to 
perform credit analyses on the loans, since all the 
loans are made among members of the same, 
commonly owned multinational group. The loans 
therefore involve no real economic risk to anyone. 
It can fairly be said that the intragroup loans exist 
only on paper, in the contracts that the group’s 
lawyers have drawn up to show to tax authorities. 
The loans nevertheless result in substantial 
reductions of corporate income taxes around the 
world, as large amounts of taxable income are 
shifted to zero- and low-tax affiliates within 
multinational groups.
Similarly, in the intangibles-centered tax-
avoidance structure, the “licensing subsidiary” 
that receives legal title to the group’s intangible 
property, and then licenses use of the intangibles 
to other group members, typically performs no 
observable activities in return for its royalty 
income. The licensing subsidiary’s ownership of 
the group’s intangible property, and its licenses of 
that property to group members, exist only on 
paper; there is no need for employees of the zero- 
or low-tax subsidiary to do anything in return for 
the income that the subsidiary receives. In the 
same vein, when “hub” subsidiaries that 
multinational groups establish in zero- or low-tax 
countries purchase tangible property or services 
from some members of a group and resell the 
property or services at a markup, the subsidiaries 
typically have no physical contact with the 
property or services in which they supposedly 
deal. The involvement of the subsidiary arises 
only on paper, in contracts drafted by the 
multinational group’s lawyers.
Similarly, in the various kinds of planning that 
involve the ostensible purchase and resale of 
property or services by zero- or low-tax 
subsidiaries, the subsidiaries typically never take 
physical possession of the property they are 
buying and selling, or have any physical 
involvement in performing the services they 
supposedly are providing. The involvement of the 
purchasing-and-reselling subsidiary occurs only 
on paper, yet tax laws around the world treat the 
transactions of the group as genuine.
A Preview of Chapter 3
The next chapter of this book will explore how 
the world’s tax laws evolved, over a period of 
34
A useful discussion of the difficulties of estimating revenue losses 
to BEPS-style tax avoidance is provided by Kleinbard, Florida Tax Review, 
supra note 30, at 737-750.
35
Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud de Mooij, and Michael Keen, “Base Erosion, 
Profit Shifting and Developing Countries,” IMF Working Paper WP/15/
188 (2015); Alex Cobham and Petr Jansky, “Global Distribution of 
Revenue Loss from Tax Avoidance,” WIDER Working Paper 2017/55 
(Mar. 2017).
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about a century, into a form that often makes it 
difficult if not impossible for tax authorities 
around the world to challenge the legal fictions on 
which BEPS-style tax planning depends. As is 
typical of organisms that have evolved over a long 
period of time, the complex of laws that protect 
international tax avoidance is intricate, with 
internal interactions that are sometimes difficult 
to understand. Chapter 3 will focus on three 
elements of the law that have been central to the 
dramatic growth, over time, of the avoidance 
structures on which BEPS-style planning are 
based:
• a tradition of “formalism” that is built into 
both corporate and corporate-tax laws, 
which makes it difficult for tax authorities 
around the world to contend successfully 
that the different companies within 
multinational groups are not “really” 
performing business activities that written 
contracts treat them as performing;
• a remarkably complicated body of 
international “transfer pricing” law, 
originating early in the twentieth century, 
which is supposed to limit transfers of 
income among members of commonly 
owned multinational groups, but which has 
proven difficult, and in many instances 
impossible, for tax administrations to 
enforce; and
• “controlled foreign corporation (CFC) 
rules,” which were designed to enable the 
home countries of multinationals to limit 
groups’ abilities to engage in profit-shifting 
around the world, but which in practice 
appear to have done little to prevent the 
proliferation of BEPS-style tax avoidance.
Then, after Chapter 3 has laid a foundation of 
basic understanding of the elements of the laws 
that have enabled BEPS-style tax avoidance, 
Chapter 4 will examine the efforts to date of the 
OECD and other international organizations, 
especially in the recent BEPS studies, to identify 
policy instruments that might reduce the extent of 
base erosion and profit shifting. Chapter 5 will 
seek to identify, both from within and from 
outside the boundaries of the BEPS analyses, a 
program of policy measures that might to a useful 
extent reduce profit-shifting from lower-income 
countries, even in view of the pressures of 
international tax competition which are likely to 
remain strong for the foreseeable future. Finally, 
Chapter 6 will consider the extent, if any, to which 
various actors in international tax policymaking, 
including the governments of countries at all 
levels of economic development and 
multinational businesses themselves, face a 
normative duty to promote policy initiatives 
intended to reduce profit-shifting from the 
world’s poorest countries. 
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